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BOOK REVIEWS
J. Hatchard, M. Ndulo and P. Slinn, Comparative Constitutionalism and Good Gover-
nance in the Commonwealth: An Eastern and Southern African Perspective, Cambridge
University Press, 2004. 361 pp. £65.00. ISBN 0 521 58464 7.
The 1990s ushered in a mood of optimism across many African states as a
flurry of democratic reforms took centre stage. Constitutions based on a liberal
blue print replaced the authoritarian systems that had become fashionable after
independence. However, such optimism has faded as some governments have
backtracked from the democratic path and manifested illiberal tendencies. A
considerable number of leaders who had championed democratic change have
sought, and in some cases obtained, constitutional amendments enabling them to
stay in power beyond constitutional term limits.
Yet, despite these setbacks, there have also been some positive developments.
Constitutional devices such as courts, ombudspersons and human rights com-
missions have successfully upheld the democratic ideal and fostered good
governance. It is in light of these contrasting developments that John Hatchard,
Muna Ndulo and Peter Slinn seek to draw lessons, both positive and negative,
about the problems of constitutionalism in the Commonwealth states of eastern
and southern Africa (ESA).
The book focuses on anglophone Commonwealth ESA countries and from the
outset, the authors acknowledge the pitfalls of using eastern and southern Africa
as a conceptual tool for analysing constitutionalism and good governance (p. 2).
The authors, therefore, make no claim to any grand theory regarding constitu-
tionalism and good governance in these states, but merely seek to draw lessons
from the experience of all these countries. In this regard, then, the book does
not provide a comprehensive analysis of the constitutional frameworks and
practices obtaining in each of the target countries, but selectively focuses on
particular elements which the authors consider as precursors to the establishment
of sustainable good governance regimes.
The authors point out that the Commonwealth is a vital component of
the constitutionalism agenda for ESA states. In this regard, they single out the
adoption of the Harare Commonwealth Declaration of 1991, which committed
Commonwealth heads of government to democracy, rule of law and respect for
human rights, as a turning point that has significantly influenced the governance
and constitutional practices of ESA states (p. 10). Indeed, the Declaration has
become the yardstick for assessing Commonwealth member states’ adherence to
constitutionalism and good governance. It is has been used as the benchmark for
expulsion as well as for admission and re-admission.
In chapters two and three, the authors focus on the post-independence
constitution-making activities of ESA states. The authors point out that in the
aftermath of independence many governments became undemocratic, over-
centralized and authoritarian (p. 19). The liberal independence constitutions
bequeathed to the newly independent states failed to work “. . . not so much
because of a failure by Africans to learn the lesson of parliamentary government:
rather the lesson of authoritarian colonial rule was taught and learnt too well”.1
In the 1990s, changes in the international political order, donor conditionalities
1 P. Slinn, “A fresh start for Africa? New African constitutional perspectives for the 1990s”,
(1991) 35 J.A.L. 1, at 6.
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and internal dissatisfaction with authoritarian-style leadership led to changes in
favour of liberal democratic governance regimes (pp. 22, 28). In this regard,
chapter three focuses on the ingredients for devising popular and durable
national constitutions. It addresses legitimacy-led issues such as seeking the
people’s views, modes of adopting new constitutions, utilizing comparative
experiences and securing the people’s approval in a referendum.
Chapters four to 11 are devoted to technical and institutional matters aimed
at ensuring good governance through constitutionalism. Recognizing that consti-
tutions may not be perfect, chapter four deals with amendments to constitutions
and the authors outline various procedural mechanisms aimed at protecting con-
stitutions from regressive amendment. In this respect, the authors point out that
the people themselves are the “guardians of the constitution” and substantive
changes to constitutions must always be authorized by them (pp. 55–56).
Chapters six and nine deal with the allied issues of enhancing access to the
political system and the devolution of power to local communities. The authors
observe that access to the political system is an integral part of good governance
and is fast becoming a normative rule of international law (p. 99), and conse-
quently point out basic requirements for ensuring access, such as conducive insti-
tutional arrangements for political party activity and effective and transparent
election processes. The legitimacy that a political system gains from inclusiveness
will further be enhanced by the provision of processes and institutions that allow
for popular participation at all levels (p. 186). However, the authors also urge
caution against devolution which enhances ethnic divisions and threatens
national identity.
Chapters five, seven and eight focus on the core arms of government—namely
the executive, the legislature and the judiciary—and how these should be insti-
tutionally structured to promote and protect constitutionalism and good
governance. The history of bad governance that has characterized most of the
countries considered in the book leads the authors to advocate strong checks
against the exercise of executive and legislative power. Consequently, chapters
eight and ten focus on the courts as well as autochthonous oversight bodies
such as human rights commissions and offices of the ombudsman, which have
the crucial role of ensuring checks on unfettered exercise of executive power.
Although the countries under consideration do not have a worrisome record
of military coups in comparison to other regions of Africa, Uganda and Lesotho
have experienced successful military coups and attempted coups have taken place
in Tanzania, Zambia and Kenya (p. 242). Consequently, chapter 11 focuses on
mechanisms aimed at maintaining constitutional control of the military. Interest-
ingly, the authors contend that military intervention in civilian governance often
results from a failure to establish and maintain effective civilian government and
institutions. The challenge, therefore, is to elicit and maintain popular support
for civilian rule through the development of effective mechanisms and institu-
tions that promote and protect good governance and the rule of law. Further-
more, the authors advocate the provision of various constitutional mechanisms
which make the usurping of power through unconstitutional means less attrac-
tive. These include providing for the political accountability of the military
(p. 252), incorporating anti-coup provisions in the constitution,2 and placing of a
duty on civilians to resist unconstitutional activities by the military (p. 259).
2 For example, art. 3(2) of the Constitution of Uganda provides: “Any person who singly or in
concert with others by any violent or other unlawful means, suspends, overthrows or abrogates this
Constitution or any part of it, or attempts to do any such act commits the offence of treason and
shall be punished according to the law”.
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The above analysis demonstrates that the book covers a considerable number
of issues relating to constitutionalism and good governance in great depth.
Although focused on ESA countries, the lessons drawn from the study are appli-
cable everywhere and highlight the constant need to ensure that governance
institutions remain accountable. It should, therefore, prove useful to practitioners
working in this area. One small criticism is that although the authors regard the
Harare Commonwealth Declaration of 1991 as an important framework for
considering constitutionalism and good governance within the ESA region, they
refrain from discussing how the countries featured in the book fair under this
framework. The question of what is the potential for good governance in the
ESA region therefore remains.
THOKO KAIME*
A. Abass, Regional Organisations and the Development of Collective Security: Beyond
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004. 239 pp, index and
bibliography. £45.00. ISBN 1-84113-480-5.
This densely constructed and well-written piece of scholarship deserves to be
widely read and considered. Although the book does beg a number of fundamen-
tal questions underlying its thesis, its study of the post-Cold War era and the
manner in which regional organizations evolved to fit into the overall framework
of collective security, challenges one’s understanding of the United Nations
Charter and the relationship between the UN Security Council and regional
bodies. In essence, Dr. Abass develops a thesis which justifies the ability of
regional organizations to escape from underneath the umbrella of the collective
security regime established by the UN Charter and to project force without
authorization of the UN Security Council and in apparent violation of Chapter
VIII of the Charter.
This study, the outcome of Ademola Abass’ Ph.D. studies at the School of
Law, University of Nottingham, is a rarity: a first-time author in the field of
public international law who establishes a distinct voice coupled with a challeng-
ing and tightly written thesis. Having said that, Regional Organisations and the Devel-
opment of Collective Security: Beyond Chapter VII of the UN Charter, does not, as a title,
convey two elementary facets of this study: it fails to impart the sense that things
have radically changed in regard to collective security both as a result of the end
of the Cold War and specifically with regard to Africa. While Dr. Abass—who
is currently Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Western England—justifies his
“considerable attention on African regional organisations” on the basis that very
little has been written about the African contribution to the development of
regional collective security, it seems that this is a rather populist justification for
a study which easily stands alone on intellectual grounds rather than on needing
to prop-up an African perspective, as things are happening in Africa which are
creating a distinct species of regional collective security. In fact, the study would
have been stronger if it had focused exclusively on Africa since the end of the
Cold War, instead of providing limited coverage of NATO’s actions in the
former Yugoslavia and more fleeting references to the OSCE and the OAS.
Dr. Abass correctly points out that “the current trend in regional collective
security portends dire consequences for Chapter VIII in particular and for the
cohesion of the UN collective security in general” (p. xx). He argues that this is
* School of Law, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.
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not a bad thing and that while Chapter VIII remains central to regional action,
“this does not and should not be taken to mean that the development of regional
collective security depends on that Chapter” (p. xxiii, emphasis in the original).
As Dr. Abass takes issue with the universal control of the use of force with regard
to collective security being vested within the confines of the UN Charter and
being the exclusive preview of the UN Security Council, he writes: “This book
challenges such orthodox positions on regional collective security” (id.). Yet, the
thesis is not as radical as one might assume, as the author continues that even if
state practice indicates a “departure from the Chapter VIII framework”, this
does not warrant a total disengagement of regional organization from the UN
Charter. Instead, Dr. Abass goes on to say that the “simple remit of this book is
to understand the development of collective security by regional organisations
and map out how this can enhance the overall scheme of collective security in
the Charter in the contemporary world order” (p. xxv).
That being said, Dr. Abass’ central thesis is that there is room for
“decentralised collective security” in which regional organizations need not
receive UN sanction to use force under the pretext of collective security. While
Abass provides a rather sophisticated justification for finding an exception to the
prohibition on the use of force beyond the control of the UN Security Council,
he finds the elasticity of article 2(4) in the writings of—not surprisingly—
American jurists who—once again, not surprisingly—have put forward the thesis
“that the deficit in the operation of collective security by the Security Council has
made the prohibition of force in Article 2(4) obsolete” (id.). Dr. Abass’ argument,
which allows for regional organizations to project force without the authorization
of the UN Security Council, is based on the notion that article 2(4), which
demands that all states “refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”,
is predicated on the final clause of article 2(4). Abass argues that “there is a lack
of consensus on what type of force is not inconsistent with the Purpose of the
UN” (p. 187); yet one needs to take issue with this. First, is it right to say that
there are types of the use of force which go beyond those allowed by the UN
Charter (re. self-defence and Chapter VII)? If so, these would have to be based
on an evolution of international customary law, and as no consensus exists, is
there not lacking the opino juris required to, in conjunction with state practice,
establish a new exception?
Yet Dr. Abass’ thesis is not concerned per se with the establishment of a
customary norm which might allow for regional collective security without UN
Security Council authorization à la Kosovo; instead he simply wants to bring into
question the strict interpretation of article 2(4) which does not allow for the use
of force outside of the confines of the UN Charter, as he questions “whether or
not consensual interventions by regional organisations violate the peremptory
norm in Article 2(4)” (p. 187). For Abass, violations of article 2(4) are not, in and
of themselves, breaches of a peremptory norm; looking to the 2001 Articles on
State Responsibility, Abass notes that the International Law Commission “iden-
tified only the prohibition of aggression as a peremptory norm under Article 2(4)”
(p. 195). If this be the case, then the use of force, which was not of a peremptory
character, would be susceptible to circumstances which would preclude its
wrongfulness. The following argument thus emerges:
“that the content of Article 2(4) is divisible into rules violating peremptory norms
(aggression) and rules violating a general prohibition but not peremptory norms
(lesser forces), [and that] it can be argued that consent given by states to regional
organisations may preclude the application of Article 2(4) insofar as such relates to
the second category of forces” (pp. 201–201).
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Abass builds on his argument by saying that states have contracted into the
UN Charter, and if the Security Council fails to take “prompt and effective
action” as mandated by article 24(1), then it abdicates its primary responsibility
for peace and security, and thus the responsibility falls to regional organizations
as a residual power, if they so desire, by contracting out of the UN system.1
Though somewhat seduced—and acknowledging the African context where the
UN Security Council has been de-legitimized by its failure to act in Liberia
and Sierra Leone, but where ECOWAS did so successfully, and haunted by the
Rwandan Genocide—one finds it difficult to accept the overarching argument
put forward by Dr. Abass. Nowhere does Dr. Abass care to define aggression
or make reference to the 1974 Definition of Aggression which speaks of the “First
use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter shall constitute
prima facie evidence of an act of aggression”2. Instead, Abass argues that: “For
instance, humanitarian intervention, though perhaps not permitted under Article
2(4), cannot be described as aggression since it is not aimed against the territorial
integrity or political independence of the target state” (p. 198, n. 2). One need
only think of Kosovo and the manner in which the public authority of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was treated, to understand that the territorial
integrity and political independence of that state was indeed targeted under the
pretext of a humanitarian intervention.
As intriguing as Dr. Abass’ thesis is, how does one square the fact that African
states remain bound by the UN Charter, yet have created within the ECOWAS
Protocol and the Constitutive Act of the African Union parallel systems of
regional peace and security which need not refer to the UN Charter imperative
of article 53, mandating that no enforcement actions take place “without the
authorization of the Security Council”? Might one argue that, in this case, the
new provisions emanating from these African inter-governmental bodies are lex
specialis which overrides the legi generali of the United Nations Charter? This could
be, but for the constitutional imperatives of article 103, which demands that
when there is a conflict with regard to “obligations of the Members of the United
Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other interna-
tional agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail”. Yet,
despite this, as I have shown elsewhere, African states, whilst not formally opting-
out of the UN system of collective security, to all intents and purposes have in
fact done so.3
Dr. Ademola Abass’s book heralds the coming of a new voice on the public
international law scene—a voice worth considering. As this book review has
made plain, the arguments put forward are intriguing, if not ultimately compel-
ling. However, the reality remains: the Economic Community of West African
States has consented to allow its membership to use force without the authori-
zation of the UN Security Council to maintain peace and security, and the
African Union has gone further by sanctioning the use of force not only to main-
tain peace and security, but also with regard to “grave circumstances, namely
war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity as well as a serious threat to
1 This interpretation seems at variance with the fact that the while the UN Security Council has
primary responsibility for peace and security, residual power is meant to fall to the other organs
of the UN (ie. the UN General Assembly via arts. 11 and 12, and the Secretariat, via the Secretary-
General and art. 99) and not states themselves either individually or collectively.
2 See art. 2, Definition of Aggression annexed to United Nations General Assembly Resolution
3314 (XXIX), 14 December, 1974.
3 J. Allain, “The true challenge to the United Nations’ system of the use of force: the failures of
Kosovo and Iraq and the emergence of the African Union”, Max Planck Yearbook of United
Nations Law, Vol. 8, 2004, 237–289.
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legitimate order to restore peace and stability”.4 Dr. Abass seeks to square this
circle by asking if there is room within article 2(4) of the UN Charter for states to
consent formally within regional organizations to provide for collective security
where the United Nations is unwilling or unable to act. It appears that where the
African Union and ECOWAS are concerned, that question has been already
answered, to the determent, and in breach, of the United Nations’ universal col-
lective security system which has existed for more than sixty years, and to the
credit of African states which have sought to establish, in the shadow of Liberia,
Sierra Leone and especially Rwanda, an effective continental system of peace
and security.
JEAN ALLAIN*
4 See art. 4, Constitutive Act of the Africa Union, 11 July, 2000, as amended by the Protocol on
Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union, 3 February and 11 July, 2003.
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